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A General Theory of Jurisdiction in
Trademark Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
Jurisdiction is an essential prerequisite for a court to adjudicate a
controversy. When a trademark registrant's product has been coun-
terfeited abroad, he or she can bring an action under the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). I In such actions, jurisdiction
presents a major issue. Section two of this comment discusses the
analysis courts employ in exercising jurisdiction in cases involving
foreign conduct. Such cases involve jurisdictional issues within both
our national and international legal systems. Section three of this
comment illustrates how and why courts will only exercise jurisdic-
tion when the entire infringement, or at least part of it, occurs in the
United States. This limitation flows from the nature of intellectual
property rights in the international legal system.2 Section four dis-
cusses the Act of State Doctrine. 3 This doctrine prohibits courts from
exercising jurisdiction in certain trademark cases to avoid questioning
a foreign nation's acts performed within its own territory or under its
own law.
II. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING JURISDICTION
Within our national legal system, the term "jurisdiction" deals
with the division of authority within the nation (i.e. in personam and
subject matter jurisdiction). 4 These intra-national jurisdictional issues
are beyond the scope of this comment.
Within the international legal system, the term "jurisdiction"
deals with the division of authority among the various nations. 5 Spe-
cifically, "jurisdiction" within the international legal system deals
with whether a nation may adjudicate a matter involving foreign con-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976). Other options include bringing an action in an
American court under foreign law, see infra notes 43, 141-44 and accompanying text, and
bringing an action in the nation where the infringement took place.
2. Discussed infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
3. Discussed infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
4. N. LEECH, C. OLIVER & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 109
(1973) (discussing the distinction between jurisdiction in the national and international legal
system).
5. Id.
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duct, where some or all of the conduct occurred abroad (hereinafter
extraterritorial jurisdiction). 6 This comment examines under what
circumstances the United States will exercise extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion under the Lanham Act. Whether an American court will find
any statute applicable, extraterritorially is a question of congressional
intent involving four steps.
7
First, the courts have employed a rule of statutory interpretation
to determine how far Congress intends a statute's jurisdiction to ex-
tend. Under this rule, the court presumes Congress intended the law
to govern only matters occurring within the United States.8
Second, the courts will examine the statute's specific language to
determine whether the language overcomes the presumption. 9 For
example, under the Lanham Act, the specific language demonstrates
an intent to regulate all commerce within Congress' control. 10 The
Act provides for extensive relief. It permits the trademark registrant
to sue "[a]ny person" who wrongfully uses the registrant's trademark
"in commerce."'" The Act defines "commerce" as "all commerce
which may lawfully be regulated by Congress."' 12 Under the Consti-
tution, the commerce that Congress can lawfully regulate includes
commerce "with foreign Nations."' 13 Foreign commerce includes im-
porting, exporting, transportation, communications, and other com-
mercial transactions between the United States and a foreign
country.' 4 The only acts excluded are those which do not affect
United States commerce.' 5 In light of the Lanham Act's broad juris-
dictional grant, the Supreme Court has held that its language over-
6. F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1973). The concept of extraterrito-
riality is discussed further infra note 29.
7. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 6-62 (1965) (discussing jurisdiction in the international legal system) [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS].
8. E.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952).
9. Id. at 282-84 (examining Act's language to determine Congress' intended jurisdic-
tional scope). Steele is discussed further infra notes 57, 119-21 and accompanying text.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1963).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
14. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1979).
15. NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (discussing congressional
power to regulate commerce); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Congress can regulate
an isolated activity which alone does not affect commerce, but when aggregated, all such activ-
ities do affect commerce). Thus, congressional authority over commerce is extremely broad. 1
J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.04[1] (1985) (discussing extent of
congressional power over infringing acts in commerce).
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comes the traditional presumption that laws are intended to apply
only to domestic matters.
16
Third, in statutes which contain sweeping jurisdictional lan-
guage, such as the Lanham Act, courts have applied those laws more
restrictively in the foreign commerce area than their language im-
pliedly permits. 17 Restricting a statute's jurisdictional scope is based
upon Congress' unstated desire to avoid international repercussions
from the overly expansive exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.18
To determine a statute's jurisdictional scope, American courts look to
international law for guidance. 19 Unless it unmistakably appears that
16. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 286.
17. Craig, Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act: The Search for a Jurisdic-
tional Standard, 7 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 295, 298-302 (1983) (discussing methodological
approach by courts, particularly in extraterritorial Sherman Act cases). For example, in Van-
ity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956), discussed infra notes 74-
80, 143-44 and accompanying text, the court declined to apply the Lanham Act extraterritori-
ally because, given the international implications of so applying it, it found that Congress did
not intend the Act to be applied extraterritorally.
18. Burr, supra note 17, at 298-99. For example, the court in Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at
642, found that the Lanham Act was to be applied less expansively than its language would
indicate. All courts agree that whether a statute will be applied extraterritorially raises a ques-
tion of subject matter jurisdiction (i.e. whether Congress intended the Act to apply to the
foreign subject matter being considered). Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556
F.2d 406, 426-30 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing extraterritorial jurisdiction under heading of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction). Other courts make short work of the subject matter inquiry, and
consider the question of extraterritoriality by examining comity and international repercus-
sions. They employ an abstention style inquiry rather than a subject matter determination.
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1295-98. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1187-88 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (explaining the difference between the two
approaches).
19. Burr, supra note 17, at 298-302; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 7, § 6 (defining "jurisdiction" as capacity of a nation under international law to
prescribe or enforce a rule of law, and making no distinction between civil and criminal cases).
"[I]nternational law is a body of consensual principles which have evolved from the customs
and practices civilized nations utilize in regulating their relationships. These customs have
great moral force, and are often cited approvingly by domestic courts." Zenith Radio, 494 F.
Supp. at 1178. It is frequently difficult to determine what the rule of international law is in a
given area. Burr, supra note 17, at 299. In the absence of a controlling treaty (conventional
international law), executive or legislative act, or judicial decision, the court must examine the
customs of nations (customary international law); and as evidence of custom, the works of
jurists and commentators. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Further, courts
must interpret international law, not as of the date the statute under which jurisdiction is being
asserted was enacted, but as it exists presently. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d
Cir. 1980) (citing Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 198 (1796). For a more detailed discussion,
see Note, Custom and General Principles as Sources of International Law in American Federal
Courts, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 751 (1982).
It is possible to argue that international law does not limit a nation's exercise of civil
jurisdiction. One important Ninth Circuit case, although recognizing that at some point a law
will not be given extraterritorial effect, stated that what that point is or "how it is determined
Loy. L.A. Intl & Comp. L. J. [Vol. 8:611
Congress intended a statute to violate international law, the statute is
interpreted to comply with it.2o Accordingly, courts can presume that
Congress intends certain laws to be applied extraterritorially, because
that is consistent with traditional principles of jurisdiction under in-
ternational law.21
Finally, courts will apply the doctrine of comity. Courts devel-
oped this doctrine to deal with the problem of two or more nations
having the right to assert jurisdiction over a transaction. This prob-
lem is inevitable when jurisdiction is exercised extraterritorially. Ap-
plying the comity doctrine, in the interest of international harmony,
the American court may decline jurisdiction in deference to other na-
is not defined by international law." Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d
597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing Miller, Extraterritorial Effects of Trade Regulation, 111 U. PA.
L. REV. 1092, 1094 (1963), which suggests that international law has not been worked out in
sufficient detail as to a country's right to exercise jurisdiction over foreign trade matters).
Hence, commentators who agree with Miller argue that international law does not limit extra-
territorial jurisdiction in civil matters (except certain international law jurisdictional defenses,
such as diplomatic immunity and sovereign immunity). Akehurst, Jurisdiction in Interna-
tional Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 170 (1972-73); but see, I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 292 (2d ed. 1973) (international law limits jurisdiction in civil
and criminal cases). Thus, in deciding whether exercising jurisdiction-within the context of
the international legal system-was appropriate, the court in Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612-13,
only applied principles of comity and fairness. Hence, the "effects test," which is one of inter-
national law's important jurisdictional principles, was "subsumed into [a] comity analysis as a
factor to be balanced, rather than being a formulaic requirement of uncertain degree." Zenith
Radio, 494 F. Supp. at 1188 (explaining Timberlane).
The court in Timberlane sends out confusing signals, however, by citing the often quoted
language that in interpreting a statute's jurisdictional scope, a court will consider " 'the limita-
tions customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers.' " Timberlane, 549
F.2d at 609 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945)). Moreover, there is universal agreement that international law limits exercising criminal
jurisdiction. E.g., United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (post-
Timberlane criminal case applying jurisdictional principles of international law). Finally, it
could be argued that any distinctions between civil and criminal proceedings under the Lan-
ham Act and the new criminal penalties for infringement are unwarranted. Civil proceedings
may result in a decree, forbidding a defendant to do many things, the violation of which may
result in a criminal sanction. Musidor v. Great American Screen, 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1981)
(criminal contempt for violating court's injunction against trademark infringement). See
Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Law, 63 YALE L.J.
639, 640-41 (1954) (no distinction warranted between civil and criminal proceedings under the
Sherman Act).
20. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (con-
gressional act never interpreted to violate international law if any other possible interpretation
remains); see also Zenith Radio, 494 F. Supp. at 1178-79 (citing The Schooner). However, if
Congress passed a statute violating international law, the courts could not prevent it from
doing so, unless the statute also violated the Constitution. Lasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
21. Zenith Radio, 494 F. Supp. at 1179.
1986] Jurisdiction in Trademark Cases
tions, and in the interest of international harmony. 22
III. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IN
FOREIGN COMMERCIAL COUNTERFEITING CASES
In his treatise on trademark protection, Jerome Gilson noted that
"with few exceptions the Lanham Act does not extend trademark
protection outside the United States."'23 Two developments threaten
to change this general rule: (1) a possible trend towards expansively
exercising jurisdiction under the Act;24 and (2) the recently enacted
Trademark Counterfeiting Act. 25 The traditional principles of juris-
diction in international law provide a convenient format for discuss-
ing extraterritorial jurisdiction under both the Lanham Act and the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act. Part A of this section discusses the
territorial principle; and Part B discusses the other jurisdictional prin-
ciples in international law, which are of comparatively minor
significance.
A. The Territorial Principle
The territorial principle deals with the relationship between a na-
tion's territorial boundaries and the extent of its jurisdiction.26 Both
the subjective and objective versions of the territorial principle limit
22. Burr, supra note 17, at 301-02; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 7, § 40. Under the Revised Restatement, the "principle of reasonableness," that
exercising jurisdiction be reasonable, is no longer merely a matter of comity, but has become a
"principle of international law." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 403 comment a (1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (REVISED)
FOREIGN RELATIONS].
23. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 15, § 9.01.
24. See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 2320 (1985). Rakoff & Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting and the Pro-
posed Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 194 (1982). "The considera-
tions held to favor extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act in civil lawsuits would seem
to apply with even greater force to actions commenced under the proposed Act, particularly to
criminal prosecutions commenced by the United States government to vindicate its own au-
thority and cleanse its territory of criminally fraudulent activities whether launched from
home or abroad." Id.
A contrary argument is suggested by those arguing that international law does not limit
the exercise of civil jurisdiction. See supra note 19. It follows that the international legal
community is more sensitive to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 22, § 403 comment e (in regulatory statutes contain-
ing both criminal and civil provisions, the presence of substantial foreign factors will weigh
against the application of criminal law, and conduct outside a nation's territory is not covered
by criminal law unless there is an express statement or clear implication to the contrary).
26. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 148 (1957).
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the exercise of sovereign power and the exercise of judicial
jurisdiction.
27
Under the territorial principle, as a limit on the exercise of sover-
eign power, the United States can only exercise jurisdiction in trade-
mark cases when at least part of the infringement occurs in the United
States.
There is a distinction between a nation's exercise of its sovereign
power, and the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in cases involving for-
eign conduct. The former is strictly confined to the nation's terri-
tory, 28 while the latter is not. The Permanent Court of International
Justice stated:
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international
law on a state is that-failing the existence of a permissible rule to
the contrary-it may not exercise its power in any form in the ter-
ritory of another state. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly terri-
torial; it cannot be exercised by a state outside its territory except
by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or
from a convention .... It does not, however, follow that interna-
tional law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in its own
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have
taken place abroad .... 29
In the area of extraterritorial jurisdiction in trademark cases, it is im-
portant to understand the restrictions on a nation's exercise of sover-
eign power. By exploring the nature of trademark rights, and a
nation's ability to create them, it becomes clear that extraterritorial
27. Zenith Radio, 494 F. Supp. at 1179 n.39. Although it is not exactly clear what the
objective/subjective dichotomy means in this context, the usage has gained widespread cur-
rency. The subjective principle is discussed infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. The
objective principle is discussed infra notes 48-116 and accompanying text.
28. E.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) ("No principle of general law
is more universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations .... It results from
this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule on another."); Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (any exercise
of sovereignty within the territory of another nation is impermissible under international law).
29. The Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 18-19 (Judgment of Sept. 7),
discussed infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. Thus, as the Permanent Court makes
clear, to say a statute is applicable extraterritorially is technically incorrect. Laws are never
applicable outside the nation enacting them. However, they may be applicable within the
enacting nation to cases concerning foreign conduct. See also B. HAWK, UNITED STATES
COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 20-21
(1979) (explaining that "extraterritorial application" of the antitrust laws means simply en-
forcing the laws respecting "conduct occurring largely outside" the United States' territorial
boundaries).
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jurisdiction may be asserted in trademark cases only when the in-
fringement, or part of the infringement, occurs in the United States.
A trademark cannot be infringed unless it has been created by
law. A trademark, like a patent or copyright, is classified as "intellec-
tual property." Intellectual property comes not from tangible raw
materials, but from the human mind. It is an intangible right. 30 Each
nation's laws determine the origin, content, protection, transfer, and
loss of intellectual property rights.31 Hence, a trademark, unlike a
piece of personal property (i.e. a handbag) would not exist in the ab-
sence of the law creating it.32 Therefore, it is impossible to infringe a
domestic trademark abroad unless it has first been created by law
abroad, because it is impossible to infringe a non-entity.
Under international law, one nation (e.g. the United States) can-
not create a trademark in the territory of another. The reason is that
no nation may exercise its sovereignty in another nation's territory. 33
As Professor Boguslavsky, a leading international commentator,
stated:
[Intellectual property] rights are based on the legislation of a par-
ticular country, which is limited to that country's territory....
This is the difference between copyright and, for example, per-
sonal property rights. A person acquiring an article in one country
is recognized as its proprietor in all other countries. However,...
copyright has no power beyond the boundaries of the country of its
origin.3
4
Thus, a trademark that is valid in several countries, constitutes not a
single trademark, but rather a "bundle" of trademark rights. Each
30. 1 J. GILSON, supra note 15, § 1.03(5) (explaining nature of intellectual property
rights, particularly trademarks). The intangible nature of intellectual property rights can be-
come confusing. It is easy to comprehend the legal consequences of a punch in the nose.
However, unlike a punch in the nose, the "force of intellectual property is more.., like that
of the invisible beam of Buck Roger's ray gun." A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 1 (1983).
31. Kegel & Seidl-Hohenveldern, On the Territoriality Principle in Public International
Law, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 245, 247 (1982) (discussing limitations that the
territorial principle places on intellectual property rights); Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S.
541, 544 (1927) (a trademark in a country depends for its protection upon the law prevailing in
that country and confers no rights except by that law's consent).
32. M. BOGUSLAVSKY, COPYRIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC WORKS 17 (1979) (intellectual property rights
come into existence "as a result of certain legal facts corresponding to the standards of copy-
right, patent or invention rights of the given country." These rights are "non-existent without
government protection."); see also Ingenohl, 273 U.S. 541 (1927).
33. See supra note 28 and authorities cited therein.
34. M. BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 32, at 16.
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trademark right comprising the bundle corresponds to the nation
upon which the right depends for its existence.3 5 This territorial na-
ture of trademarks has been recognized by commentators,3 6 foreign
courts,3 7 and in international treaty practice.38 It has been recognized
in the United States by the Department of State and the courts.
The Department of State has recognized the territorial limita-
tions on the creation of trademark rights. Responding to an Ameri-
can firm's letter concerning interference with its United States
trademark in Cuba, the Department stated: "[i]n the absence of
treaty stipulations to the contrary, the registration of a trademark in
the United States ... [does not] confer upon the owner of such trade-
mark a right to the exclusive use thereof in Cuba."' 39 In short, United
States law, in the absence of a treaty to the contrary, cannot create a
trademark right in a foreign nation.
Just as United States law cannot create a trademark abroad, for-
eign law cannot extinguish a domestic trademark right. This latter
35. Kegel & Seidl-Hohenveldem, supra note 31, at 247-48.
36. Id. (discussing intellectual property); M. BOGUSLAVSKY, supra note 32, passim (dis-
cussing copyright); Koch & Froschmaier, The Doctrine of Territoriality in Patent Law and The
European Common Market, 9 IDEA 343, 344 (1965) (discussing patents); II S. LADDAS, PAT-
ENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS 1340 (1975) (discussing trademarks).
37. In holding that a Czechoslovakian nationalization decree could have no effect on
French registered trademarks, the Court of Appeals of Paris recognized:
The right of ownership in a mark, however protection for the same may have been
acquired-whether by direct registration or by international registration, which is
assimilated to the former-is an incorporeal right situate in the country in which it
has been created and which provides for its exercise and protection independently of
the laws giving protection in other countries. It cannot be affected by measures of
expropriation and confiscation enacted in a foreign country ....
Enterprise Nationale L. et C. Hardtmuth v. Fabrique de Crayons Koh-i-noor, 26 I.L.R. 50,
50-51 (France Ct. of App. 1958). Three other European decisions came to the same result as
the French court. Koh-i-noor, L. & C. Hardtmuth v. Koh-i-noor, Tuzkarna L. & C.
Hardtmuth, 26 I.L.R. 40 (Austria Sup. Ct. 1958); Koh-i-noor Tuzkarna L. & C. Hardtmuth
Narodni Podnik v. Fabrique de Crayons Hardtmuth, 26 I.L.R. 44 (Italy Ct. of App. 1958);
Koh-i-noor Bleistift Fabrik L. & C. Hardtmuth v. Fabrique de Crayons Koh-i-noor L. & C.
Hardtmuth, 24 I.L.R. 46 (Switz. Fed. Trib. 1957).
38. International intellectual property treaties are discussed in Schuyler, Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property - A View of the Proposed Revisions, 8 N.C.J. INT'L L.
& COM. REG. 155, 160 (1983). International intellectual property treaties do not establish a
world-wide intellectual property system. Rather, they reaffirm the territorial principle under
which intellectual property rights are determined by the law of the nation in which protection
is sought. See, e.g., quoted portion of French case supra note 37 and infra note 129 and ac-
companying text.
39. Correspondence from Counselor Lansing to Senator Penrose, April 30, 1915, MS.
Department of State, file 837.543, reprinted in 2 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW § 116, at 24-25 (1941). For additional examples illustrating the territoriality
principle, see generally 2 G. HACKWORTH, § 116, at 24-25.
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principle was applied in Baglin v. Cusenier Co.4° In Baglin, the plain-
tiff, an order of Monks, had been manufacturing world famous liquor
(Chartreuse) in France for several hundred years. The trademarks
were registered in the United States. The order of Monks was dis-
solved by French Law. A French liquidator took possession of their
properties. The Monks moved to Spain and continued manufacturing
the liquor under the ancient and secret process. Meanwhile, back in
the United States, the French liquidator marketed a product bearing
marks similar to those used by the Monks. The Monks brought an
infringement action in the United States. The Court had to decide
what affect the French liquidation proceedings had on the Monks'
United States trademark rights.41 The Court held, "[tihe French law
cannot be conceived to have any extra-territorial effect to detach the
trade-marks in this country from the product of the Monks .... "42 In
short, one country's legislation has no effect on trademark rights
outside its territory.
The two premises just presented and the conclusions following
from them are conveniently summarized as follows:
- A United States trademark right cannot be violated abroad un-
less United States law has first created it abroad.
- United States law cannot create a United States trademark right
abroad.
Hence, a trademark infringement that occurs entirely abroad
could be litigated in the United States based only on a violation of a
40. 221 U.S. 580 (1911).
41. Id. at 591.
42. Id. at 596. For a more contemporary case similar to Baglin, see F. Palicio y Compa-
nia v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 490-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Cuban nationalization has io effect
on United States registered trademarks because a nation's trademark legislation has no extra-
territorial effect), afl'd, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967); see also cases cited supra note 37. The
court in Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (1982) held that
under the territorial principle of trademarks, " 'the protection of a trademark in a certain
country depends exclusively on the law of that country, and that the effects of a trademark
ownership by use or registration in a country do not reach beyond the borders of that coun-
try.'" Id. at 1066 (quoting II S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS
1340 (1975)). Regarding patents, the United States Supreme Court has held:
Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; 'these acts of Congress
do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States,'
...and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such control over our
markets. . . . To the degree that the inventor needs protection in markets other
than those of this country, . . . [he must] seek it abroad .... "
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972), discussed further infra
note 162. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 22, § 415
comment g.
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foreign trademark and foreign trademark law.43 Liability under the
Lanham Act turns on the existence of an infringement of an Ameri-
can trademark,"4 and requires that at least part of the infringement
occur within United States territory.45 Judicial decisions interpreting
the extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Lanham Act are
consistent with this rule, as will be illustrated.
1. The subjective territorial principle
Under the principle of sovereignty, nations have jurisdiction over
acts and omissions occurring within their boundaries, and objects
within their territory. 46 When an infringing act occurs entirely within
the United States, the issue of extraterritoriality is not involved and
the United States clearly has jurisdiction. Additionally, this principle
clearly justifies exercising jurisdiction over infringing articles found
within the United States.47 In addition, the subjective territorial prin-
ciple allows a court to exercise jurisdiction when a crime is com-
menced domestically but consummated abroad.48 However, in
43. Kegel & Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 31, at 248. This leaves open the possibility of
suing in an American court based upon foreign trademark laws. The Second Circuit indicated
that this might be a possibility in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.
1956). The possibility was also explored in Kirios, Territoriality and International Copyright
Infringement Actions, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 53, 62-78 (1972). This novel ques-
tion of law was presented in London Film Prods. v. Intercontinental Communications, 580 F.
Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). This case is discussed infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1963). One exception is section 1125, false designation of origin
and false descriptions. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1983), reproduced infra note 67. The purpose of that
section is to make actionable the deceptive use of false designations of origin on goods contain-
ers or in connection with services. New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, Inc., 595 F.2d
1194 (9th Cir. 1979). Under this section, liability may arise for a false description or represen-
tation even though no trademark is involved. Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publica-
tions, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1974). Because liability under the section turns upon the
activities of the defendant, and not infringement of intellectual property rights, this section
may not be limited by the territorial nature of intellectual property rights.
45. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1956). The Vanity
Fair court observed that "foreign law confers no privilege in this country that our courts are
bound to recognize." 234 F.2d at 639, (citing Baglin, 221 U.S. 580 (1911) and Ingenohl, 273
U.S. 541 (1927)). Similarly, the court continued, the trademark rights of Americans abroad
are determined by foreign law, not U.S. law. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 639. The court went on
to decline to exercise jurisdiction over an entirely foreign infringement action. See discussion
infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 17.
47. Id. This principle would justify asserting jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982),
dealing with imports of infringing products into the United States.
48. Jennings, supra note 26, at 156. Some commentators, such as Jennings, draw a dis-
tinction between the objective and subjective territorial principles. The distinction between the
two is not completely clear, however. As a matter of categorization, it could be argued that
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asserting jurisdiction over cases involving any foreign conduct, U.S.
courts have focused on the objective territorial principle.
2. The objective territorial principle
In exercising jurisdiction in cases involving foreign conduct,
courts have relied on the objective territorial principle. This principle
justifies exercising jurisdiction in two situations: where a constituent
element of an act takes place in the United States, and when the ad-
verse impact of an act abroad is felt in the United States.
a. the objective territorial principle's constituent element version
In trademark infringement cases, U.S. courts are likely to exer-
cise jurisdiction when a constituent element of the infringement takes
place within the United States. Constituent, or material, elements of a
law are known as the corpus delecti (body of a crime). 49 For example,
manslaughter is (a) any act, (b) which causes the death, (c) of another
human being, (d) with the actor behaving recklessly or under the in-
fluence of extreme mental or emotional stress. 50 Each of these ele-
ments is a constituent element of the crime of manslaughter. Under
the constituent element version, if any of the above stated elements
occurred within a particular territory, that territory would have juris-
diction of the case. The classic case applying the constituent element
version in the international law context is The Lotus.5' In that case,
French and Turkish ships collided in international waters killing sev-
eral Turkish nationals. The Turkish government sought to prosecute
the French officer in charge of the watch for the deaths of the Turkish
citizens. The court in The Lotus held that it could exercise jurisdic-
some or all of the cases discussed under the objective territorial principle should have been
discussed under the subjective territorial principle. Therefore, in the interests of clarity, in this
comment all cases involving foreign conduct, regardless of where the acts were commenced or
consummated, are discussed under the objective territorial principle. In this connection
Akehurst's observation is appropriate:
At the turn of the century some writers argued in favour of conferring jurisdiction on
the State where the crime was initiated, others argued in favour of conferring juris-
diction on the State where the crime was completed. But the arguments were so
evenly matched that it was eventually realized that there was no logical reason for
preferring the claims of one State over the claims of the other; and the only alterna-
tive to granting jurisdiction to neither State (which would have led to intolerable
results) was to grant jurisdiction to both states.
Akehurst, supra note 19, at 152.
49. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 4, at 16 (1972).
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
51. The Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9 (Judgment of Sept. 7). See
Jennings, supra note 26, at 159-60 (construing The Lotus).
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tion because two constituent elements of the crime of manslaughter,
the death of a human being, occurred in Turkey (the Turkish boat).
The court found it immaterial that the other elements took place on
French territory (the French boat), and that the French officer was at
all times on French territory. 52 Thus, The Lotus stands for the propo-
sition that a nation may exercise jurisdiction over an offense, so long
as at least one of the constituent elements takes place within its
territory.
Applying the constituent element approach to the Lanham Act is
more complex. The elements constituting a violation under section
1114(a) of the Act are: (a) using a registered mark, (b) without con-
sent, (c) in commerce, (d) in connection with selling, distributing or
advertising goods, (e) in a deceptive manner.53 These elements are
not so discrete that it can be positively determined whether a particu-
lar element took place in a particular nation.
However, a trademark infringement scheme may involve many
essential steps leading to the eventual sale of the counterfeit goods:
forging the trademark, buying components for the bogus products,
assembling the product, packing it, labeling it with the mark, etc.
Some of these essential steps, viewed in isolation, are lawful. In trade-
mark cases, however, the Supreme Court has held that these other-
wise lawful "essential steps" in an infringement scheme "lose that
character when they become part of an unlawful scheme."'5 4 Once
part of an unlawful scheme, the individual essential steps become un-
lawful, and, if any of them take place in the United States, they can
provide a jurisdicitonal basis. Thus, similar to The Lotus case, juris-
diction may be exercised in trademark cases when part of the unlaw-
ful activity takes place in the territory of the forum nation.
52. The Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 20.
53. This is an oversimplification of the actual provision which reads:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant- use in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in con-
nection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive . .. shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant . . ..
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1963).
54. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. at 287, discussed further infra notes 119-21 and
accompanying text.
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i. infringing acts commenced abroad and consummated in the
United States
Clearly, it is permissible to exercise jurisdiction under the Lan-
ham Act when the violation is consummated in the United States.
The court in Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., easily found
jurisdiction over the defendant. There, the defendant, a cigar manu-
facturer owned by the Cuban government, affixed infringing trade-
marks to cigars which were manufactured, boxed, and labeled in
Cuba. The cigars were shipped to the United States with the knowl-
edge and intention that they would be sold to American consumers.
The court held:
In cases of trade-mark infringement and unfair competition, the
wrong takes place not where the deceptive labels are affixed to the
goods or where the goods are wrapped in the misleading packages,
but where the passing off occurs, i.e., where the deceived customer
buys the defendant's product in the belief that he is buying the
plaintiff's.
56
Menendez leaves the clear implication that an American court can
assert jurisdiction under the Lanham Act even if the infringing acts
took place outside the United States "where the effects of the acts
complained of were felt in this country .... -57 The opinion states that
it was abundantly clear that its exercise of jurisdiction was entirely
consistent with international law. 58
Although Menendez involved a case in which the defendant di-
rectly sold the counterfeit products into the United States, jurisdiction
can also be properly found even when the defendant does not directly
introduce the goods into the United States. Such a situation would
involve the defendant selling the goods to a third party, who in turn
55. 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds, Menendez v. Saks &
Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
56. Id. at 557.
57. Id. at 558. See also Steele, 344 U.S. at 288.
58. Id. Of similar effect is Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Canada,
Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 429 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). There, a Canadian company manufactured and sold
infringing products in Canada. It advertised the products on a radio station in Buffalo which
could be received by Canadian consumers. These advertisements violated 15 U.S.C.
§ 11 14(l)(a) (1963). See supra note 53. The court held that it had jurisdiction, and that no
question of extraterritorial jurisdiction was presented. Miller, 452 F. Supp. at 442. Interest-
ingly, plaintiff conceded that the court lacked jurisdiction over the sales of the allegedly in-
fringing products abroad. Id. at 444 n.6.
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sells them to someone in this country.59 Because a major concern of
the Lanham Act is preventing the deception of consumers,6° a court
would be likely to exercise jurisdiction in such a case if the products
were causing deception in the United States.
61
ii. infringing acts commenced in the United States and
consummated abroad
A basis for jurisdiction also arises when the infringing actions are
commenced in the United States and are consummated abroad. In
Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co. ,62 the defendant
affixed counterfeit labels to its products in Mexico where it then sold
the products. The labels, however, were printed in the United States.
Section 1114(1)(b) of the Lanham Act prohibits the (a) in commerce,
(b) application, of a (c) counterfeit, (d) registered trademark, to (e)
labels, packages, or advertisements, etc., (e) intended to be used in
connection with selling, distributing, or advertising of goods, (f) in a
deceptive manner.63 The court in Ramirez & Feraud found that the
production of the infringing labels constituted "acts committed in the
59. It is possible to contend that the mere fact that the infringing products are eventually
found in the United States does not justify a court in exercising jurisdiction. Such an approach
would limit the holding of Menendez to cases where the defendant actually introduced or sold
the counterfeit goods to someone in the United States. This narrow approach follows from
Marvel Products, Inc. v. Fantastics, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 783 (D. Conn. 1968), which dealt with
the exercise of jurisdiction in the national legal system (whether a court in one state of the
United States could exercise jurisdiction over a person in another state). In Marvel Products,
the defendant entered into the sales contracts outside the forum state. Additionally, the de-
fendant merely sold the infringing products to national retailers, and therefore, the products
only indirectly entered outlets in the forum. The court held that neither the sales consum-
mated outside the forum nor the resales by independent retailers in the forum justified assert-
ing jurisdiction over the defendant. Marvel Products, 296 F. Supp. at 787.
60. Menendez, 345 F. Supp. at 557-58.
61. Thus, in Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594, 599
(S.D. Cal. 1956), af'd, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), discussed infra notes 62-65 and accompa-
nying text, the court exercised jurisdiction even though the infringing sales took place in Mex-
ico. One factor in its decision was that the products were carried by consumers back into the
United States, thereby causing confusion in the United States. Id. However, the counterfeit
labels were also manufactured in the U.S. Id. at 598.
62. 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956), affd, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957).
63. This is an oversimplification of the actual provision which reads:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant- reproduce, counterfeit,
copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counter-
feit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, recepta-
cles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 14(l)(b) (1963).
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United States which clearly [violated] the Lanham Act." 64 The court,
therefore, exercised jurisdiction based upon the unlawful acts commit-
ted in the United States which led up to the foreign sales. 65
In Scotch Whiskey Association v. Barton Distilling Co. ,66 the court
exercised jurisdiction although the defendant's domestic acts, viewed
in isolation, were lawful. The alleged wrong in Scotch Whiskey was
the false designation of Scottish origin on the product's label. The
plaintiff was an association promoting Scotch Whiskey interests. The
action was brought under section 1125 of the Lanham Act which pro-
hibits (a) the affixation, of (b) a falsely designated origin, (c) to goods,
(d) used in commerce. 67 In Scotch Whiskey, the product was sold
exclusively in Panama. Moreover, the actual affixation of the false
labels took place in Panama. However, the defendant procured the
64. Rarnirez, 146 F. Supp. at 601-02.
65. Id. Out of the handful of extraterritorial Lanham Act cases, several have used this
rationale, e.g., Hecker H-O Co. v. Holland Food Corp., 31 F.2d 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (jurisdic-
tion over passing off abroad when labeled with infringing mark in U.S.), affTd, 36 F.2d 767 (2d
Cir. 1929).
In American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.
1983), each of the activities from processing and packaging to transportation of the products
leading up to the passing off abroad occurred in the United States. Although it is not com-
pletely clear, it appears that the products were also labeled here and that the labels were pro-
duced here, since the American defendant was a supplier of the labels. The court exercised
jurisdiction. Id. at 414-15, discussed further infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
An interesting twist on this same theme is A.T. Cross Co. v. Sunil Trading Corp., 467 F.
Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). There, the American defendant concocted a sophisticated scheme
to counterfeit the American plaintiff's pens. The pens were manufactured in Taiwan. Defend-
ant bought them in Taiwan and shipped them here to be exported to the Canary Islands. The
warehousing of the pens in the United States, viewed in isolation, was lawful. However, it was
an essential step in the infringement scheme because it enabled defendant to avoid import
duties, and, more importantly, permitted defendant to disguise the true nature of the pens as
having been made in Taiwan and not here. Id. at 49; see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying
text for discussion of lawful activities as an essential step in the infringement scheme. Finally, a
false designation of origin was placed on the goods in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1982),
reproduced infra note 67. Both the lawful, and unlawful essential steps in the infringement
occurring in A. T. Cross presented a jurisdictional basis under the Lanham Act. A. T. Cross, 467
F. Supp. at 50.
66. 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973).
67. This is an oversimplification of section 1125 which reads:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any
false description or representatation, including words or other symbols tending
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to
enter into commerce, . . . shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing busi-
ness in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said
locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged
by the use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
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labels and containers in the United States before shipping them to
Panama. Otherwise lawful steps in an infringement scheme become
unlawful when they are part of an overall infringement scheme.68 Be-
cause the court viewed all these acts as a single transaction, it held
that the domestic acts presented a sufficient basis for exercising juris-
diction.69 Like Ramirez, this case exemplifies the state of the law in
this area for over eight decades.70 In both cases the courts exercised
jurisdiction when an essential step of the infringement scheme, lead-
ing up to the infringing sales abroad, occurred in the United States.
After finding that a jurisdictional basis exists, but before actually
exercising jurisdiction, courts will generally consider the comity
problems posed by exercising jurisdiction. For example, in Scotch
Whiskey, after concluding that there was a jurisdictional basis, as dis-
cussed above, the court went on to explore whether exercising juris-
diction would be an affront to Panama's sovereignty. The court
implied that the Panamanian Government did not protect the sale of
spirits labeled "Scotch Whiskey. ' 71 Further, and most significantly,
the relief granted in Scotch Whiskey had no extraterritorial effect. It
applied only to the domestic activity of producing the falsely desig-
nated labels. These considerations are of the type courts explore
under the Act of State Doctrine, discussed in section four of this com-
ment. Comity considerations are mentioned here primarily to show
that the same types of factors can be considered in deciding whether
to exercise jurisdiction in the first instance, and whether to apply the
Act of State Doctrine, a jurisdictional defense.
68. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
69. Scotch Whiskey, 489 F.2d at 812.
70. For some reason, special significance has been attributed to Scotch Whiskey. Two
student commentaries suggest that it represents an abandonment of the "place-of-the-tort
test," Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act: Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo
Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977), 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173, 185 (1979);
Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act; American Rice, Inc, v. Arkansas Rice
Growers Cooperative Ass'n, 9 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 133, 139 (1983). Whatever the
term "place-of-the-tort test" means as used in these works, Scotch Whiskey does not announce
or abandon anything which had not already been done as early as the turn of the century. It
goes no further than to say that jurisdiction may be exercised even when some of the infringing
acts occur abroad. Scotch Whiskey, 489 F.2d at 812. The same approach was used in Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Eagle Oil Co., 154 F. 867 (C.C.D.N.J. 1907). There, the products were packaged
and shipped unmarked from the United States to avoid a technical violation of the trademark
laws. They were passed off abroad. However, because an essential step of the infringement
scheme took place here, the court exercised jurisdiction. Id. at 874. See also Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, discussed infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
71. Scotch Whiskey, 489 F.2d at 812.
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iii. infringing acts commenced and consummated abroad
The objective territorial principle's constituent element version
does not authorize jurisdiction when the acts are both commenced
and consummated abroad. That is the import of Vanity Fair Mills v.
T Eaton Co. 72 and its progeny, which make the Lanham Act inappli-
cable to entirely foreign infringing acts.
The court in Vanity Fair declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant for infringing acts which occur entirely outside of the
United States. In Vanity Fair, the defendant was sued for selling in-
fringing products in Canada and the United States. The court indi-
cated that it would have been possible to exercise juridsiction over the
domestic sales. However, the plaintiff did not press its claims based
upon the domestic sales, perhaps because they were of minor signifi-
cance.73 The bulk of the Canadian defendant's sales occurred in Can-
ada, and involved Canadian manufactured goods. While Vanity Fair
is sometimes cited for the three prong test it employed, 74 its true sig-
nificance is its holding that jurisdiction may not be exercised when all
of the essential steps of the infringement take place abroad.
75
Vanity Fair was reaffirmed in American White Cross Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. H.M. Cote, Inc.76 That case is factually similar to Vanity
Fair. The defendant in White Cross committed independent acts of
infringement in the United States. However, the bulk of the infring-
ing acts occurred in Canada. As in Vanity Fair, the White Cross court
indicated that it might have been possible to exercise jurisdiction over
the independent acts of infringement which occurred in the United
States.77 However, the court refused to exercise jurisdiction over the
entirely foreign acts of infringement. It held that Vanity Fair is "con-
trolling authority for the proposition that insofar as [plaintiff] alleges
trademark infringement and unfair competition occurring within
Canada, the complaint does not state a claim arising out of the laws of
72. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). See infra text accompanying notes 143-44.
73. Id. at 647.
74. This test considers: (1) whether the defendant's conduct has a substantial effect on
U.S. commerce; (2) the nationality of the defendant; and (3) the potential conflicts with foreign
law. Id. at 642. In applying this test, although the conduct may have had a substantial effect
on commerce, id. at 642, the court was concerned that the defendant was an alien, id. at 643,
and with the potential conflicts with foreign law, id. at 646-47.
75. Id. at 642-43.
76. 556 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
77. Id. at 758.
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the United States."' 78 In short, the Lanham Act is inapplicable to en-
tirely foreign infringement, i.e. when no essential step in the infringe-
ment scheme takes place in the United States. The court allowed
leave to amend on the jurisdictional issue respecting the domestic in-
fringement. It stated: "[t]he amended complaint must be limited to
acts of infringement ... within the United States. Plaintiff may wish
to consider . . . the pursuit of broader remedies in the courts of
Canada. "
7 9
Vanity Fair and White Cross make it clear that infringing domes-
tic sales do not justify jurisdiction over infringing foreign sales. The
domestic sales are viewed as independent acts of infringement. They
apparently cannot be viewed as an essential step in an overall infring-
ing scheme, which would justify asserting jurisdiction over the entire
scheme. 80
b. the objective territorial principle's adverse impact version
To summarize, the objective territorial principle's constituent el-
ement version only justifies exercising jurisdiction when an essential
step of the infringement scheme occurs in the United States. How-
ever, the objective territorial principle could arguably justify a court
in exercising jurisdiction in trademark cases when activities commit-
ted entirely abroad adversely impact on United States' commerce. 81
Nevertheless, such an application would be problematic.
i. application of the objective territorial principle's adverse
impact version
The classic American case articulating the adverse impact ver-
sion is United States v. Aluminum Co. of America8 2 (Alcoa). In that
78. Id. While White Cross clearly recognized the controlling nature of Vanity Fair, id. at
757-58, it was able to reach its conclusion without applying the three part Vanity Fair test.
79. Id. at 760. Vanity Fair's three part test was also recently followed in C-Cure Chemi-
cal Co. v. Secure Adhesives Corp., 571 F. Supp. 808 (W.D.N.Y. 1983). The C-Cure court
held: "[t]he clear import of Vanity Fair Mills is that the Lanham Act should not be applied to
a foreign citizen allegedly committing infringing acts in his or her home country." Id. at 821.
80. As noted, in both Vanity Fair, and White Cross, there were some domestic sales, yet
jurisdiction was not exercised over the foreign sales. See also Miller Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp.
at 442 n.6, discussed supra note 58.
81. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 22, § 402(l)(c). Unless
the exercise of jurisdiction would otherwise be unreasonable, "a state may, under international
law, exercise jurisdiction to prescribe and apply its law with respect to conduct outside its
territory which has or is intended to have [a] substantial effect within its territory." Id.
82. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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case, Judge Learned Hand was faced with an agreement between for-
eigners in violation of the U.S. antitrust laws. None of the conspira-
tors' conduct occurred in the United States. In the now famous
language of the case, Judge Hand declared it to be settled law "that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its alle-
giance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends. ' 83 Judge Hand found that ju-
risdiction could be exercised in Alcoa since conduct outside the
United States was intended to, and did, adversely impact on United
States' commerce.8 4 For the purposes of this test, "commerce" in-
cludes domestic and foreign commerce. The Alcoa test also justifies
exercising jurisdiction when conduct abroad affects exports from the
United States.85 Because the test is so expansive, its utility in trade-
mark cases should be obvious, but the difficulty is finding some limit-
ing principle.
Rackoff and Wolff, in their article on foreign counterfeiting, sug-
gest how the adverse impact approach can be applied in trademark
cases. 86 They conclude that the United States can exercise jurisdic-
tion in trademark cases when an offense has an "adverse impact
within" the United States. 87 They point out, for example, that the
adverse impact on the computer industry in American commerce is
"unquestionable":
To take one company in the computer industry as an example, the
exports of Apple Computer, Inc. to the Far East have been signifi-
cantly affected by counterfeit products originating in Taiwan. In a
recent New York Times article, Jeremy Lack, general manager of
the California company's Hong Kong distributors, stated that the
Hong Kong market for genuine Apple home computers (is no
83. Id. at 443.
84. Id. at 444.
85. Blechman, Remarks on Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59,
62 (1984). For example, in Pacific Seafarers Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804
(D.C. Cir. 1968), the defendants conspired to exclude the plaintiff from shipping goods be-
tween Taiwan and Vietnam. Because the foreign conduct affected the plaintiff's export of ship-
ping services in the United States, the court exercised jurisdiction. Id. at 816. See Blechman,
supra, at 62, describing Pacific Seafarers as an example of extraterritorial jurisdiction's furthest
limits.
86. Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 25, at 191-95.
87. Id. at 192 n.320. For this proposition they relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 18. However, the Restatement (Second) only permits
exercising jurisdiction based upon an effect in the United States which constitutes a constituent
element of a crime or tort. Id. § 18, which is reproduced infra note 133; cf RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 22, § 402(l)(c), reproduced supra note 81.
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longer there).88
Rakoff and Wolff presumably used this as an illustration of an in-
stance where the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction would be jus-
tified based on the adverse impact on exports from the United States.
A major problem with the adverse impact approach is the lack of
a limiting principle. As Judge (then Professor) Jennings stated, once
we move out of the sphere of constituent elements of a crime, or phys-
ical consequences, "to employ the formula of 'effects' is to enter upon
a very slippery slope; for here the effects within the territory may be
no more than an element of alleged consequential damages which
may be more or less remote." 89 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America,90 an antitrust case, Judge Choy grappled with the problems
presented by the overexpansiveness of the adverse impact approach.
Timberlane has been characterized as "[t]he most thorough and
thoughtful analysis of the concerns relevant to the assertion of extra-
territorial jurisdiction ... "91
Judge Choy was well aware of the almost universal expression of
sentiment that the United States was violating international law by
applying its trade law extraterritorially. 92 He noted that the adverse
impact test was incomplete, because it failed to adequately address the
concerns of comity and fairness. Thus, he devised a new three step
analysis. First, it requires "some effect" on American commerce, so
88. Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 25, at 192 n.320.
89. Jennings, supra note 26, at 159.
90. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
91. Zenith Radio, 494 F. Supp. at 1187 (characterizing Timberlane).
92. "Extraterritorial application is understandably a matter of concern for the other
countries involved. Those nations have sometimes resented and protested, as excessive intru-
sions into their own spheres, broad assertions of authority by American courts." Timberlane,
549 F.2d at 609. Some American decisions have produced criticism internationally. One
noted example is United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). There, the American court ordered the defendant, a British company, to divest itself of
certain patents. However, these patent rights were the subject of a grant of exclusive license,
lawful under British laws, from another British company. The British court required the de-
fendant to keep the agreement with the other British corporation stating: "[a]pplied con-
versely, I conceive that the American courts would likewise be slow (to say the least) to
recognize an assertion on the part of the British courts of jurisdiction extending (in effect) to
the business affairs of persons and corporations in the United States." British Nylon Spinners
Ld. v. Imperial Chemical Indus. Ld., [1953] 1 Ch. 19, 24, made permanent, [1955] 1 Ch. 37.
Britain has since enacted the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, Ch. II, § 1-8,
which provides for the non-recognition and non-enforcement of measures taken by other na-
tions applying to things done outside such countries when such measures would damage Brit-
ish trading interests. See D. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A
NUTSHELL 122-23 (1984), explaining that this Act was principally aimed at United States
antitrust laws.
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as to justify jurisdiction under the Constitution's commerce clause.
Second, it requires the effect to be a sufficient restraint on the plain-
tiff's trade to constitute an antitrust violation. Thus, under the test's
first and second prongs, the adverse impact or effect is relevant only
as it relates to our national legal system; the Constitution and the
antitrust laws. Finally, the analysis requires a comity balancing test
designed to address the special problem of exercising jurisdiction in
the context of the international legal system. This third prong incor-
porates the adverse impact as one of the seven factors to be balanced,
and not as a separate inquiry. The factors are:
1. degree of conflict with foreign laws or policy;
2. nationality of the parties and, the locations or principal
places of business of the corporation;
3. the extent to which enforcement by either state will achieve
compliance;
4. the relative significance of the effects on the United States as
compared with effects elsewhere;
5. the extent to which there is an explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce;
6. the foreseeability of such effect; and,
7. the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad
(extent to which conduct in the United States is a significant
part of an alleged violation). 93
93. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612-14. After Timberlane, the Congress passed 15 U.S.C.
§ 6 (1984), which provides:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other
than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations;
or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States ....
Id.
It has been said that section 6 does not overrule Timberlane but merely clarifies the "effects"
element of the test. Wallace, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 15 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1099, 1119
(1983). However, Timberlane's first prong merely requires "some effect." The court specifi-
cally rejected the requirement that the effect be "substantial." Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12.
Furthermore, Timberlane was premised upon the notion that the adverse impact or effect was
only considered as a separate factor under the national legal system's laws (constitution and
antitrust laws). Id. at 611-12. Section 6 makes it clear that the adverse impact must be "di-
rect, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" and makes it clear that, in the context of jurisdic-
tion in the international legal system, "adverse impact" is a separate factor to be considered,
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J.
After Timberlane, Judge Choy applied the comity balancing test
in a trademark case, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.94
There, the plaintiff brought a trademark infringement action against
both an American and foreign defendant. The Wells Fargo court held
that the Lanham Act's extraterritorial reach should not be gauged by
the locus of the activity to be reached, but by the nature of its effect on
commerce. 95 Finding that the lower court erroneously applied the
Vanity Fair test, which emphasizes the locus of the activity to be
reached, the court remanded the case to the lower court with instruc-
tions to apply the Timberlane test.96 In the context of trademarks,
this test has two prongs. First, the foreign activities must have some
effect on United States' foreign commerce. Second, the seven factor
comity balancing approach is applied. In trademark cases, there is no
counterpart to the second prong of the test used in antitrust cases,
namely that the effect must be a sufficient restraint on plaintiff's trade
to constitute an antitrust violation.97
The test announced in Wells Fargo would seem to permit the
exercise of jurisdiction over entirely foreign infringing acts. However,
the facts of Wells Fargo, involving an infringement scheme which oc-
curred partly in the United States, do not justify such an expansive
reading. In Wells Fargo, the plaintiff alleged that the foreign defend-
ant directed the American defendant's domestic activities from
abroad. The court suggested that the American defendant was acting
as the foreign defendant's agent in the United States. 98 Thus, the for-
eign defendant actually committed unlawful infringing acts in the
United States through its American agent. Jurisdiction over the do-
mestic infringing acts would be justified under the "fundamental 'ter-
ritorial' reach of the Lanham Act." 99 Thus, exercising jurisdiction
over the defendant's foreign activities presented little difficulty. The
court made it clear that the American and foreign activities would be
viewed as part of an overall infringing scheme. °° Hence, the limited
and not simply subsumed into a comity balancing approach as one of many factors to be
balanced.
94. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
95. Id. at 428.
96. Id. at 427, 430.
97. Id. at 428.
98. Id. at 419.
99. Id. at 430. This phrase was probably a reference to the subjective territorial principle,
which justifies asserting jurisdiction over activities in the United States, discussed supra note
47 and accompanying text.
100. Id. For this proposition the court relied on Ramirez and Feraud Chili Co. v. Las
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holding of Wells Fargo is the unremarkable proposition that extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction is permissible under the Lanham Act when an es-
sential step of the infringement takes place domestically.
ii. potential problems of the Wells Fargo adverse impact approach
Professor Wilson, speaking of the Wells Fargo test, stated that
"such a 'test' has substantial potential for working a restrictive trade
effect and for inviting retaliation by other countries, virtually all of
whom have a national scheme for recognizing and for regulating
trademarks."101 Post- Wells Fargo cases make it abundantly clear that
the rule of Wells Fargo is not the law in the Second
10 2 and Fifth 0 3
Circuits. Perhaps the failure of some circuits to follow the Wells
Fargo test stems from the test's unsound analogy between antitrust
and trademark laws. This analogy is troublesome because it ignores
the territorial nature of intellectual property rights, and because in
antitrust law, unlike trademark law, an adverse impact is a constitu-
ent element of the offense.
To the extent that the Wells Fargo test permits exercising juris-
diction over entirely foreign infringement actions, it ignores the terri-
torial nature of intellectual property rights. A trademark created by
the Lanham Act does not exist outside the United States. Therefore,
an American trademark cannot be infringed entirely outside the
United States. 104
Further, under antitrust law, the plaintiff must prove that he has
been injured, since injury is a constituent element of the offense.
10 5
However, the plaintiff in a trademark case need not be injured in or-
der to state a prima facie case for trademark infringement. 106 Thus,
Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956), af'd., 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957),
discussed supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text, which permits exercising jurisdiction over
infringement schemes consummated abroad but commenced domestically. The Wells Fargo
court, however, did not specify exactly what the foreign activities were or how they could be
considered part of an overall infringing scheme.
101. D. WILSON, supra note 92, at 276.
102. For discussion of the Second Circuit approach see supra notes 72-80 and accompany-
ing text.
103. The Fifth Circuit follows the Second Circuit approach. American Rice, Inc. v. Ar-
kansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n., 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983), discussed further infra
notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1984) provides: "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue .... " Id. Under
this standing requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has been injured.
106. In Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 558, 560 (S.D.N.Y.
1986]
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under the constituent element approach, it would technically be per-
missible to exercise jurisdiction in an antitrust case whenever the
plaintiff suffers an adverse impact on his business in the United States
because one of the offense's constituent elements, suffering an injury,
would have occurred in the United States. This rationale is inapplica-
ble in trademark cases. Since injury is not a constituent element of
the offense of infringement, a constituent element of the offense does
not occur in the United States when only an adverse impact is felt
domestically.
The single trademark case applying the Wells Fargo approach,
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc. ,107 declined
to exercise jurisdiction. Playboy dealt with whether the court would
enjoin the defendant's sales in foreign countries of allegedly infringing
1972) discussed supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text, the court exercised jurisdiction over
infringing acts commenced abroad, even though the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that they
had been injured; but see 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1982) (false designation of origin) reproduced
supra note 67. Thus, the plaintiff need not demonstrate injury to state a claim under the
Lanham Act, but must demonstrate an injury under the antitrust laws. Undoubtedly, this is
the reason that in Lanham Act cases there is no counterpart to the second prong of the
Timberlane test, which requires that the effect be substantial enough to state a cognizable
injury under the antitrust laws. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Hence, there are two important distinctions between extraterritorial antitrust cases and
Lanham Act cases. First, the application of the Lanham Act is limited by the territorial na-
ture of trademarks. Second, the plaintiff in antitrust cases must demonstrate an injury. But,
imagine this hypothetical "trademark" statute:
Anyone who (a) in the foreign commerce of the United States, (b) commits an act
which-if committed in the United States-would constitute trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act, and (c) such act adversely affects the export opportunities of
the trademark registrant in the United States, shall be liable ....
The first notable feature of the hypothetical statute, is that liability does not turn upon
trademark infringement. Part (b) merely defines the type of acts the defendant must commit to
be liable, and these acts need not constitute trademark infringement where they were commit-
ted. Liability does not turn upon interference with intellectual property rights, which are lim-
ited to the territory of the nation upon which they depend for their creation. Thus, it would
arguably avoid the limitations imposed by the territorial nature of trademarks.
The second notable feature of the hypothetical statute is that part (c) requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate an injury in the United States. Thus, the plaintiffs injury in the United
States would constitute a material element of the offense. As Akehurst explains:
[I]f a State wishes to punish someone for causing certain effects, it can evade the
restrictions imposed by the 'constituent elements' approach by creating a new offence
... . Suppose A kills B in State X, leaving B's widow in State Y destitute. Y cannot
try A for murder; but it could create a new offence of causing the destitution of
widows by killing their husbands, and try A for that. This would be lawful under the
constituent element approach because one of the constituent elements of the new
offence (the destitution of the widow) has occurred in State Y.
Akehurst, supra note 19, at 155.
The point is that a "trademark" statute could be conceived which would avoid the two
distinctions between extraterritorial jurisdiction under the antitrust laws and the Lanham Act.
107. 511 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), af'd, 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1981).
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foreign language sex-oriented magazines. Specifically refusing to hold
whether it would follow Wells Fargo, the Playboy court stated that
even if it did, Wells Fargo would not justify asserting jurisdiction. °S
Two of the seven factors of the Timberlane- Wells Fargo comity
balancing test clearly militated against exercising jurisdiction in Play-
boy. The court, under the second factor, determined that the defend-
ant was not an American national. 109 The seventh factor, the extent
to which conduct within the United States is a significant component
of the alleged violation, cut against exercising jurisdiction. The de-
fendant did not transact business in this country. Moreover, the al-
legedly infringing foreign language magazines were sold abroad.' 10
The remaining five factors of the comity balancing test either fa-
vored the exercise of jurisdiction or were inconclusive. Considering
the first factor, the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the
court observed that the trademark policy of the defendant's home
country, Italy, and American trademark policy, were consistent. I II
Because of this consistency, the third factor, the extent to which en-
forcement would achieve compliance, militated in favor of exercising
jurisdiction. There was a probability that the Italian courts would
enforce the Playboy court's order.1 12 The court considered the fourth
108. Id. at 495. Post-Playboy Second Circuit cases make it clear that Wells Fargo is not
followed there. See supra notes 76, 79 and accompanying text.
109. Playboy, 511 F. Supp. at 495-96. For discussion of defendant's American nationality
bolstering the basis for asserting jurisdiction, see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
110. This prong of the comity balancing text originates from Kingman Brewster's jurisdic-
tional rule of reason test. Timberlane, 597 F.2d at 613 n.31 (citing K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST
AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958)). Brewster originally phrased this factor "the
relative significance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared
with conduct abroad." K. BREWSTER, supra, at 446. This somewhat unclear language was
substantially adopted by Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614. Clearly, what Brewster had in mind
was that frequently the foreign conduct is "part and parcel of a total scheme" including some
conduct in the United States. K. BREWSTER, supra, at 447. This prong of the test, expressed
succinctly, envisions a consideration of "[t]he extent to which conduct within the United
States is a significant component of the alleged violation." Wallace, supra note 93, at 1114. To
the extent conduct within the United States is a significant component of the alleged violation,
the case for asserting jurisdiction is strengthened. K. BREWSTER, supra, at 447. The court in
Playboy, understandably confused by Brewster's original phraseology, erroneously compared
the unlawful conduct's relative foreign impact to its domestic impact. Playboy, 511 F. Supp. at
495-96. That inquiry is dealt with in a separate prong of the Timberlane- Wells Fargo analysis,
number four in the following discussion, infra note 113 and accompanying text.
I ll. Playboy, 511 F. Supp. at 495.
112. In discussing this factor the Playboy court alluded to a countervailing consideration:
that denial of relief would not leave plaintiff without a remedy. Plaintiff could seek relief in
Italy. Id. This factor in the balancing analysis comes from section 40 of the Restatement
(Second), which states that exercising jurisdiction may be unreasonable when it will not be
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factor, the impact of the unlawful activity in America compared to
the impact in the foreign country. Plaintiff alleged that the damages
abroad were the same as in America. Plaintiff also argued that it lost
substantial revenue in the United States because of the alleged in-
fringement of its trademark abroad.1 13 The court did not discuss the
sixth factor, foreseeability of the effects."t 4 However, it was estab-
lished that defendant's foreign conduct was consistent with an inten-
tion to exploit the plaintiff's mark abroad."l 5 Finally, since the
conduct was intentional, it would follow that there was an explicit
purpose to harm or affect commerce, the balancing test's fifth
factor. "16
The application of the balancing approach in Playboy seems
somewhat dubious. The outcome, however, is unassailable. Jurisdic-
tion can only be exercised in trademark cases when justified under the
constituent element approach-when an essential step of the infringe-
ment occurs domestically. In Playboy, the court correctly declined
jurisdiction because no essential step of the infringement action took
place in the United States.
B. The Remaining Jurisdictional Principles of International Law in
Trademark Cases
It has been demonstrated how the territoriality principle justifies
effective in attaining the objectives of the law in question; for example, where the court has no
way to enforce its order. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 40
comment e.
113. Although the court did not seem to deny these allegations, it stated that plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that the foreign effects were greater than the domestic effects. It stated
that even if the overseas violations could be proved, their effects would be relatively inconse-
quential compared to the potential effects of a possible violation in this country. Playboy, 511
F. Supp. at 495-96. The court appears to have applied the test backwards. The whole idea of
the adverse impact approach is that the greater the effect in the United States, the greater the
basis for exercising jurisdiction. Perhaps what the court was getting at was that the plaintiff's
losses abroad were insufficient to warrant granting an injunction.
114. The court thought there were six, not seven factors in the Timberlane- Wells Fargo
test. Id. at 495-96.
115. Id.
116. In this connection, the court stated that the evidence was not convincing that the
efforts were intended to hurt commerce. Id. at 495. The court did not explain exactly what the
phrase "intend to hurt commerce" means in this context. With the possible exception of nefa-
rious communist conspiracies to undermine America's economy, few schemes are intended to
hurt commerce as their ultimate goal. It would be reasonable to assume that an intentional
effort to capture the plaintiffs share of the market by exploiting its mark, would constitute an
intention to harm commerce. Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 429 (suggesting that purposeful and
deliberate scheme to capitalize on plaintiff's trademark cuts in favor of exercising jurisdiction).
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exercising jurisdiction in trademark cases. The remaining principles
of jurisdiction in international law are of comparatively minor signifi-
cance in trademark cases. In fact, it has been said that only the terri-
toriality principle is relevant in cases involving economic regulatory
matters." 7 However, other jurisdictional principles demonstrate the
type of comity considerations which bolster a claim for asserting juris-
diction. These are the nationality, protective, passive personality, and
universality principles.
1. The nationality principle
Under the nationality principle, a nation may claim jurisdiction
over acts committed by its nationals abroad. 18 Although the
Supreme Court discussed the nationality principle in Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co.,'"9 jurisdiction over the acts of counterfeiting in that case
was justified under the constituent element approach.
In Steele, the American defendant sold Mexican manufactured
counterfeit products in Mexico. The Court justified extraterritorial
jurisdiction by stating:
[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law
from governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas
or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or
their nationals are not infringed. With respect to such an exercise
of authority there is no question of international law, but solely of
the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the
citizen in relation to his own government. ' 2
0
117. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1179 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
118. Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in United States Trade Law: The
Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439, 443 (1981).
119. 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952).
120. Id. (quoting Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)). See also American Rice,
Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 416 (5th Cir. 1983) (trademark
case mentioning the nationality principle), discussed supra note 65, and infra, notes 138-40 and
accompanying text. Explaining the nationality principle, the court in Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1984) stated:
Just as the locus of the regulated conduct or harm provides a basis of jurisdiction, the
identity of the actor may also confer jurisdiction upon a regulating country. The
citizenship of an individual or nationality of a corporation has long been a recognized
basis which will support the exercise of jurisdiction by a state over persons. Under
this head of jurisdiction a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law governing the con-
duct of its nationals whether the conduct takes place inside or outside the territory of
the state.
Id. (citing Steele, 344 U.S. 280 (1952) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 7, § 30(l)(a) (jurisdiction based on nationality)). The application of the nationality
principle may involve complex issues of the nationality of a corporation. For a discussion of
1986]
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However, as previously noted, the Steele Court based jurisdiction
primarily on the constituent element version of the objective territo-
rial approach. The defendant purchased unfinished products in the
United States, affixing the counterfeit label in Mexico. The Court
viewed these purchases as "essential steps in the course of business
consummated abroad, [and therefore,] part of an unlawful
scheme." 121 So in Steele, as in all of the other extraterritorial Lanham
Act cases, an essential step of the infringement occurred within the
boundaries of the United States. It is doubtful that the Court would
have exercised jurisdiction based solely on the nationality principle.
2. The protective or security principle
Under the protective or security principle of jurisdiction, a na-
tion may exercise jurisdiction when a foreign act threatens its secur-
ity, territorial integrity, or political independence. 122 Only in unusual
cases might this principle bolster a claim for asserting jurisdiction.
However, in some cases, for example, where counterfeit parts have
been used in military equipment, it could be argued that an infringe-
ment has affected America's national defense preparedness.
l2 3
3. The passive personality principle
The passive personality principle permits a nation to exercise ju-
the problems of corporate nationality in this context, see Marcuss & Richard, supra note 118,
at 456-58.
121. Steele, 344 U.S. at 287; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text. Furthermore,
in Steele, the plaintiff's Texas sales representative received numerous complaints from plain-
tiff's customers in the Mexican border area. Id. at 285. Hence, there is evidence that the
Mexican sales caused confusion in the United States. See discussion supra note 61 and accom-
panying text for relevance. Moreover, by the time the case reached the United States Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court of Mexico had nullified defendant's trademark registration. Id.
122. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 118, at 445-46; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN
RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 33. Interestingly, this principle is particularly concerned with the
counterfeiting of a state's seals and currency, and the falsification of its official documents.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 33(2). Of course, such coun-
terfeiting, unlike commercial counterfeiting, always involves an important national interest.
For a recent case discussing the principle, see United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 216
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (shooting of Congressman in Guyana on official business had potential effect
on security and governmental functions, providing basis for jurisdiction under protective prin-
ciple and other principles).
123. Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 25, at 153. "Inevitably, commercial counterfeiters have
not been able to resist seeking to defraud the biggest 'consumer' of all, the United States De-
partment of Defense, and thus to jeopardize to some extent national defense and security." Id.
They cite several examples, including Bell Helicopter parts placed in NATO fleets purportedly
causing several accidents in the United States. Id.
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risdiction when a national is injured by an alien's foreign acts. 1 2 4 This
is the most questionable basis for asserting jurisdiction. 125 Clearly,
American courts will not exercise jurisdiction in trademark cases
merely because the plaintiff is a United States citizen. 126 However,
American citizenship may be a factor to consider in a comity balanc-
ing test.
4. The universality principle
Under the universality principle a nation may exercise jurisdic-
tion over persons outside of its territory for crimes repugnant to the
law common to all nations. This principle focuses on crimes of con-
cern to the public order of every nation (e.g. piracy).127 While trade-
mark rights are clearly not universal, trademark law, in contrast to
other areas of the law, does possess a universal ingredient.
The basic idea of the universality principle is that certain viola-
tions are cognizable everywhere. This concept is inapplicable respect-
ing jurisdiction over trademark infringement. About one hundred
years ago, the view was held that a trademark lawfully affixed to a
product in one country would be recognized everywhere it went. This
view was referred to as the universality principle. 128 However, it has
124. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 118, at 447.
125. Jennings, supra note 26, at 155; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 7, § 30(2) (rejecting passive personality principle); and Zenith, 494 F. Supp. at 1179
n.38 ("the United States does not accept [the passive personality] principle as a legitimate basis
for jurisdiction"); but see Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 216 (that victim was a U.S. citizen provided
basis for jurisdiction under passive personality principle; however, court did not decide
whether this basis alone would be sufficient).
126. The passive personality principle was rejected as a basis for asserting jurisdiction in
trademark cases by the court in American White Cross Laboratories, Inc. v. H.M. Cote, Inc.,
556 F. Supp. 753, 758-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (the residence or domicile of the injured party
within the state not sufficient for extraterritorial jurisdiction), discussed supra notes 76-80 and
accompanying text.
127. Marcuss & Richard, supra note 118, at 447; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS, supra note 7, § 34. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)
(tort action against Paraguayan citizen visiting United States-who in Paraguay, wrongfully
caused a former Paraguayan citizen son's death by torture-allowable under universality prin-
ciple). Historically, this principle was applied to the international problem of piracy. Recently,
states have extended the universality principle to other crimes considered to be a threat to the
well being of the international community. Such crimes may include aircraft hijacking and
terrorism, "now considered by the international community to be deserving of treatment in a
manner traditionally reserved for piracy." Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 223.
128. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (whether
foreign manufactured imported merchandise-containing trademark lawfully affixed abroad
under foreign law-would infringe American trademark owner's trademark, is question of his
American trademark rights).
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been pointed out that the universality principle of trademarks was fa-
tally flawed:
[I]t failed to recognize that legal rights within one sovereignty are
creatures of that sovereignty's law. The establishment by A of
legal rights to exclusivity in one country could obviously not satis-
factorily be squared with B's establishment of exclusive right in a
second country, if either right (much less if both) were thought to
extend across the world universally. The principle was perhaps
based on an idealistic view of the world as a single marketplace.
That view, however, did not conform to reality or to international
treaty. While it might have been possible to imagine the develop-
ment of a unified world marketplace, organized on the same set of
assumptions that have dominated the creation of a single market-
place among the United States, the development between nations
did not occur in that fashion. 129
Thus, as has been demonstrated throughout this comment, trademark
protection in one nation does not extend throughout the world.
Hence, a violation in one country is recognizable only under that
country's laws, and the universality principle, as a jurisdictional basis,
will not be applied in trademark cases.
Nonetheless, the substance of trademark law does possess univer-
sal characteristics. A distinction between antitrust law and trademark
law, which arguably militates in favor of a more expansive application
of the Lanham Act than the antitrust laws,130 is that the antitrust laws
are devoid of any universal ingredient. Antitrust laws are distinc-
tively American. 131 Conversely, trademark infringement is proscribed
both criminally and civilly in numerous nations throughout the
world. 132 Thus, the Lanham Act may be said to have universal char-
acteristics. This fact arguably justifies extending the Lanham Act's
129. Id. at 1172. The universality principle's second flaw, according to the court, was "the
failure to recognize that, within one country, a mark may represent a factually different good-
will from that which the mark signifies elsewhere." Id.
130. However, two major distinctions between the extraterritorial application of the anti-
trust laws and the Lanham Act, which have already been discussed, militate in favor of a more
restrictive application of the Lanham Act. First, that the Lanham Act, but not the antitrust
laws, is limited by trademark's territorial nature. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
Second, that under the antitrust laws, but not the Lanham Act, an impact on the plaintiff's
business in the United States may be viewed as a constituent element of the offense. See supra
notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
131. Jennings, supra note 26, at 146.
132. Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 25, at 192 n.320.
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applicability beyond that of less universal laws. 133 However, the ex-
tent of the Lanham Act's jurisdiction must always be interpreted in
light of the abandonment of the universality principle in favor of the
territoriality principle. Until our international order radically
changes into a single marketplace, American courts must refrain from
violating a foreign nation's sovereignty by extending the Lanham Act
to entirely foreign infringing acts. In cases involving an entirely for-
eign infringement, an American court can adjudicate the matter con-
sistently with the present international legal order only by applying
foreign law. ' 34
C. Summary of the Territorial Principle
Jurisdiction in trademark cases is limited by the territorial nature
of trademark rights; that trademark protection in one nation does not
extend beyond that nation's territory. Under the subjective territorial
principle, courts can exercise jurisdiction over infringing acts occur-
ring entirely within the United States, and infringing articles found
domestically. Respecting infringements taking place abroad, courts
must look to the objective territorial principle. The objective territo-
rial principle's constituent element version permits exercising jurisdic-
tion when an essential step in an infringement scheme occurs
domestically. The objective territorial principle's adverse impact ver-
sion permits courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign conduct
which produces an adverse impact domestically. Certain language in
the Wells Fargo opinion indicates the approach could be used in
133. Id. For example, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7,
§ 18 provides:
A state has jurisdiction. . . [over] conduct [occuring] outside its territory and [caus-
ing] an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of
a crime or tort under the law of states with reasonably developed legal systems,
or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the
rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by
states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
Id.
Arguably, trademark infringement would come under the less stringent requirements of sec-
tion 18(a). Rakoff & Wolff, supra note 25, at 192 n.320. Antitrust, and most other economic
regulatory matters, come under the more stringent requirement of section 18(b). RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 7, § 18 comment f.
134. For a discussion of the application of foreign law, see infra notes 141-144 and accom-
panying text.
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trademark cases. However, applying this approach in trademark
cases would be contrary to the territorial nature of trademark rights.
The remaining jurisdictional principles are of limited importance
in trademark cases. Although the nationality principle-justifying ju-
risdictional basis upon the defendant's nationality-has been men-
tioned in trademark cases, jurisdiction in such cases was warranted
under the territorial principle. The nationality principle, like the
others, may suggest factors which may bolster a claim for jurisdiction;
for example: the protective principle can be invoked when national
security is threatened; the passive personality principle can be used
when there is an American defendant; and the universality principle
may bolster a claim when the defendant allegedly commits crimes re-
pugnant to all nations.
IV. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The Act of State Doctrine is likely to be raised as a jurisdictional
defense in extraterritorial trademark cases. Once a court has deter-
mined that a statute may be applied extraterritorially to reach the
conduct in question, there are three defenses the court might recog-
nize to block its exercise of jurisdiction. First, the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity may be raised in certain circumstances by a foreign
nation when it is being sued in an American court.1 35 Second, the
doctrine of sovereign complusion may be raised by any defendant
whose alleged wrongful activities were compelled by a foreign sover-
eign. 1 36 These doctrines have little importance in trademark cases.
However, under the final jurisdictional defense, the Act of State Doc-
trine, American courts will not question the validity of a foreign na-
tion's law or its acts performed with that foreign nation's territory.
37
135. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1984). However, the doctrine of sovereign immunity can only
be raised by a nation when it is being sued for a sovereign act, not a commercial act. Id. at §
1605(a)(2). Normally, commercial counterfeiting would be a commercial act. Hence, in Me-
nendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), a trademark suit
against a Cuban government owned cigar manufacturer, the doctrine of sovereign immunity
was not raised as a bar to the action. Discussed supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
136. The sovereign complusion defense was unsuccessfully raised in Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). There, plaintiff alleged that defendant
secured foreign patents by fraud, which, if perpetrated in the United States, would have pro-
duced antitrust liability. The court held, "by issuance of the patents per se, the foreign govern-
ments did not force the defendant to exclude the plaintiff from the foreign markets and the
defense of compulsion is not available." Id. at 1294.
137. Kleinman, The Act of State Doctrine-From Abstention to Activism, 6 J. CoMP. Bus.
& CAP. MKT. L. 115 (1984). In the earlier expressions of this judicial abstention doctrine,
courts emphasized the sovereign independence of states, stating that the courts of one country
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Within the trademark arena, such a law or act by a foreign nation
would be the recognition of the defendant's right to use a trademark
within that foreign nation's borders. The Act of State Doctrine is
likely to be an issue in cases where the infringement is consummated
abroad. In deciding whether or not to invoke the Act of State Doc-
trine, a court will consider three factors: whether the defendant's for-
eign trademark rights are superior to the plaintiff's foreign rights;
whether the lawsuit is based upon an alleged trademark infringement;
and whether the plaintiff is requesting relief respecting the defendant's
conduct outside the United States. These three factors will now be
discussed.
A. The Defendant's Foreign Trademark Rights Must Be Superior
to the Plaintiff's
The Act of State Doctrine is applicable only where defendant's
foreign trademark rights are superior to plaintiff's, whether the ac-
tion is based on domestic or foreign law. A "superior" right to use a
will not judge the acts of a foreign government done within that government's territory. Un-
derhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The modem trend is to emphasize the separa-
tion of powers among the various branches of government and leave foreign policy matters to
the executive. Banco Nacionale de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964).
One of the first trademark cases to apply the Act of State Doctrine stated: "we do not
think it the province of United States . . . courts to determine the validity of trade-marks
which officials of foreign countries have seen fit to grant. To do so would be to welcome
conflicts with the administrative and judicial officers [of foreign nations]." Vanity Fair Mills v.
T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 (2d Cir. 1956) discussed infra notes 143-44 and accompanying
text. This language led Professor Nimmer to conclude that the Act of State Doctrine would be
inapplicable in most copyright actions. Nimmer argued, "[i]n adjudicating an infringement
action under a foreign copyright law there is, then, no need to pass upon the validity of acts of
foreign governmental officials." 3 M. NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (1984). The
reason was that "unlike the United States copyright law, under virtually all foreign copyright
laws there are no administrative formalities which must be" complied with to create or perfect
a copyright. Id. Similarly, another commentator has argued that often copyright protection
arises "not because of an act of a sovereign state, but solely on the basis of acts done by the
author" (i.e. merely placing the proper notice on all authorized copies). Kirios, supra note 43,
at 65. Thus, copyright protection does arise because of a sovereign state's act, such as the
enactment of a copyright statute. Therefore, the Act of State Doctrine arguably applies when-
ever the existence or validity of a copyright under foreign law is questioned.
The court in Mannington Mills, in sweeping dicta, seemed to indicate, however, that the
Act of State Doctrine would never be applicable in intellectual property cases:
The grant of patents for floor coverings is not the type of sovereign activity that
would be of substantial concern to the executive branch in its conduct of interna-
tional affairs. . . . [T]he granting of patents per se, in substance ministerial activity,
is not the kind of governmental action contemplated by the act of state doctrine or its
correlative, foreign complusion.
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294. However, Mannington Mills was an antitrust case.
Therefore, the existence or validity of foreign patents was not called into question.
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trademark can exist when a foreign nation has granted the defendant
the exclusive legal right to use that trademark. If the foreign nation
grants both the plaintiff and defendant concurrent rights, then neither
has a superior right.
1. Actions based on domestic law
In American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative As-
sociation, 38 the court declined to apply the Act of State Doctrine.
There, defendant, a gigantic agricultural concern, was growing and
packaging rice in the United States for use in Saudi Arabia. Plaintiff
sued defendant, alleging that the Saudi Arabian sales constituted
trademark infringement. Under Saudi law, the defendant only had a
right to use the trademark concurrently with plaintiff. No Saudi
court or agency had determined that defendant could use its marks to
the exclusion of the plaintiff. Thus, the Act of State Doctrine was
inapplicable in American Rice since the Doctrine applies only when
the foreign sovereign has determined the defendant's rights to be su-
perior to the plaintiff's rights. 139 The rationale of the Act of State
Doctrine is clearly illustrated by American Rice. A court will invoke
the Doctrine and not exercise jurisdiction if the exercise of jurisdic-
tion would offend a foreign nation. If Saudi Arabia had granted the
defendant exclusive trademark rights, jurisdiction over the defendant
would be inappropriate since the American court cannot contradict
the Saudi government by saying that the plaintiff, and not the defend-
ant, has the right to use the trademark in Saudi Arabia. Because the
foreign sovereign in American Rice had not already determined the
defendant's rights to be superior to the plaintiff's rights, there was no
risk of contradicting foreign law. 140
2. Actions based on foreign law
Similarly, the Act of State Doctrine is inapplicable in actions
based on foreign law when defendant's foreign trademark rights are
not superior to plaintiff's. In London Film Productions, Ltd. v. Inter-
continental Communications, Inc. ,141 a British plaintiff sued an Amer-
138. 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1983).
139. Id. at 415-16. In fact, is was possible that defendant had no right to the trademark
under Saudi law. Id.
140. Id.; see also Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594
(S.D. Cal. 1956) (Act of State Doctrine not applicable where defendant's rights not superior to
plaintiff's rights), aff'd, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957).
141. 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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ican defendant in an American court. The suit was for copyright
infringement in a number of South and Central American countries
who had adopted by treaty the plaintiff's British copyright. No viola-
tion of United States law was alleged. There was no dispute that
plaintiff had stated a valid cause of action under foreign law. And
defendant apparently did not argue that it had exclusive rights to use
the trademark abroad. London Film did not involve a particular na-
tion granting a trademark or copyright; rather, it involved a copyright
adopted under an international convention. Therefore, the Act of
State Doctrine was inapplicable since there was no possibility of con-
tradicting a foreign nation's law.'
42
In Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T Eaton Co., on the other hand, the
validity of a trademark granted by a foreign nation was being ques-
tioned. There, the court applied the Act of State Doctrine. 143 In Van-
ity Fair, plaintiff claimed a right to recover under foreign law.
Defendant had registered the allegedly infringing "Vanity Fair" mark
in Canada, where the alleged infringement took place. Plaintiff,
owner of the "Vanity Fair" trademark in the U.S., also unsuccessfully
attempted to register its mark there. Only by negating defendant's
exclusive right to use its trademark in Canada could plaintiff prevail.
Plaintiff did not argue that an American court could compel Canada
to change the registration. It argued, however, that the court could
compel defendant to cancel its Canadian registration. In short, plain-
tiff explicitly attacked the validity of defendant's foreign registered
trademark, contending that it infringed on plaintiff's domestic trade-
mark. Plaintiff indirectly asked the court to reverse a Canadian gov-
ernmental act-the granting of exclusive rights to the defendant. This
the court would not do.44 Thus, Vanity Fair and London Film stand
for the proposition that an American court can apply foreign trade-
mark law; however, the court cannot question the validity or exist-
ence of a foreign trademark by reversing a foreign nations' grant of
exclusive rights to the defendant.
142. Id. at 49. The court also extensively cited Nimmer for the proposition that copyright
cases do not implicate the Act of State Doctrine. The court stated that the foreign nation's
"adherence to the Berne Convention in 1970 automatically conferred copyright protection on
these films in Chile. Therefore, no 'act of state' is called into question here." Id. (including an
extensive discussion of M. NIMMER, supra note 137). However, the holding is justified on the
more narrow ground that defendant's copyright rights were not superior to plaintiffs rights.
143. 234 F.2d at 646-47. See also C-Cure Chemical Co. v. Secure Adhesives Corp., 571 F.
Supp. 808, 821 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (refusing to adjudicate claim when likely to question foreign
law).
144. Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 646-47.
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B. The Action Must Be Based Upon Infringement
The court in Dahigren Manufacturing Co. v. Harris Corp. 145
made it clear that the Act of State Doctrine applies only in infringe-
ment actions, and it is not enough that the case touches upon trade-
mark rights. Dahlgren involved a suit to enforce a licensing
agreement relating to patents that ten foreign nations issued to Dahl-
gren. The court did not view the action as a patent action. Rather, it
saw the action as a simple contract suit, alleging breach of the under-
lying agreement. The claim did not seek to "void any foreign patent
obtained by Dahlgren but merely [sought] to refrain the Plaintiff from
using those patents which [were] allegedly.., being used in violation
of a contract .... -146 Because this was a contract and not an in-
fringement action, the Act of State Doctrine was inapplicable.14 7
C. Applicability of the Act of State Doctrine May Depend Upon the
Relief Requested
When American courts grant injunctions respecting conduct
abroad, this is likely to produce serious comity problems. It is diffi-
cult to imagine how any international legal rule or comity principle
could prevent an American court from enjoining unlawful acts per-
formed within the United States; however, there is contrary authority.
We have seen that in cases where the infringement is consum-
mated abroad, jurisdiction can only be exercised based upon the exist-
ence of unlawful acts within the United States. 148 It would seem,
therefore, that limiting injunctive relief to unlawful conduct per-
formed within the United States would avoid comity implications,
145. 399 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1975). The question of the Act of State Doctrine's
applicability in patent cases is essentially similar to trademark cases. "Without question, the
considerations of comity with respect to another country's trademarks are substantially the
same as those involved regarding foreign patents." Id. at 1257. One possible distinction in this
regard between copyright law, on the one hand, and trademark and patent law, on the other,
has been mentioned. See supra note 137. However, there is another possible distinction be-
tween copyright and trademark law with regard to comity concerns. The public interest of the
foreign nation concerned is minimal in trademark cases when compared to copyright cases.
The reason is that if the defendant is prohibited from using a particular trademark, she can still
compete under another name. However, respecting copyrights, relief against a defendant "will
effectively deprive the marketplace of something that local law has provided shall be available.
The public interest in the widest possible dissemination of information is recognized as an
important goal by nearly all nations." Kirios, supra note 43, at 61.
146. Dahlgren, 399 F. Supp. at 1256.
147. Id. at 1258. See also Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294 (Act of State Doctrine
inapplicable in antitrust action dealing with patents).
148. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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and the Act of State Doctrine.1
49
Nevertheless, one older case, George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cos-
metic Co. 150 applied the Act of State Doctrine even though unlawful
infringing acts were committed domestically. In Luft, the defendant
was manufacturing products and affixing them with infringing labels
in the United States. The court recognized that affixing the infringing
labels was unlawful. However, the products were exported to foreign
countries. In these countries the defendant's right to the trademark
was superior to the plaintiff's. For the court to have ordered that
defendant could not use the mark abroad, therefore, would have re-
sulted in questioning foreign law. Consequently, the court went on to
say that it would not enjoin the unlawful activities in the United
States concerning the foreign markets. The court held: "[w]e do not
see upon what 'principles of equity' a court can enjoin the initiation of
acts in the United States which constitute no wrong to the plaintiff in
the country where they are to be consummated."'I' However, a court
149. It would seem to be inherent in the doctrine of sovereignty that American courts
should be able to prohibit the violation of American laws within our territory. See supra note
47 and accompanying text. The court in Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 489
F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973) relied heavily upon the fact that it was not granting extraterritorial
relief in exercising jurisdiction. See discussion of Scotch Whiskey supra notes 66-71 and ac-
companying text. In Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408
(N.D. Ill. 1972), the defendant raised the validity of the plaintiff's foreign patents as a affirma-
tive defense. The court held that the foreign infringement action was barred by the Act of
State Doctrine. Id. at 409-10. Nevertheless, it held it could enjoin the manufacture of the
infringing machines in the United States (which were then shipped abroad), since such manu-
facture violated our laws. Id. at 411.
150. 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1944).
151. Id. at 540; see also C-Cure, 571 F. Supp. at 821 (citing Luft, 142 F.2d at 540). It has
been argued that Luft's reasoning has been reaffirmed by Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972), which did not cite Luft. Kirios, supra note 43, at 60-61 (citing
Luft, 142 F.2d at 540-41 and Deepsouth, 406 U.S. 518 (1972)). In Deepsouth, the defendant
was manufacturing component parts of a machine in the United States. These parts were
purposefully shipped abroad unassembled to avoid liability for patent infringement in the
United States. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523-24 n.5. The Supreme Court refused to enjoin the
manufacturing of the component parts of the machine even though, if assembled in the United
States, the machine would infringe plaintiff's patent. The reason was that as a matter of statu-
tory construction, the patent laws were interpreted to have no extraterritorial effect. Id. at
531. In other words, the patent laws apply only to patent violations occuring within the U.S.
But jurisdiction under the Lanham Act may be based upon domestic steps in a trademark
infringement scheme that are lawful when viewed in isolation, even though the infringement is
consummated abroad. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 287 (1952) discussed supra
notes 54, 119-26 and accompanying text. The reason was that, as the Steele Court held, other-
wise lawful domestic steps in a trademark infringement scheme lose that character when they
become part of an unlawful scheme. Id. In short, there is a difference between a court's juris-
diction in a patent case and a trademark case. The former is strictly territorial. Therefore,
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should be able to enjoin domestic activity which the legislature,
through the Lanham Act, clearly deems to violate our law.
D. Summary of the Act of State Doctrine
Under the Act of State Doctrine, courts will not adjudicate a
claim when to do so would result in questioning a foreign nation's
administrative or judicial acts performed within its own territory re-
garding trademarks or a foreign nation's trademark law. The Doc-
trine is likely to come into play when the infringement scheme is
consummated abroad. Three factors need be considered when analyz-
ing Act of State cases. First, the Doctrine applies whenever the exer-
cise of jurisdiction would result in questioning a foreign nation's acts
or laws. Such questioning occurs when the defendant's foreign trade-
mark rights are superior to the plaintiff's rights, or where a party is
raising the existence or validity of a foreign trademark. Second, ac-
tions touching on trademark rights, but not based on infringement per
se, do not implicate the Act of State Doctrine. Finally, the doctrine is
arguably not implicated when the relief requested is limited to unlaw-
ful domestic infringing acts.
V. CONCLUSION
The limitations on extraterritorial jurisdiction in trademark cases
stem from the nature of our international legal order, made up of sov-
ereign equal nations. The first limitation in trademark cases is that
trademark protection in one nation does not extend beyond its terri-
tory. Hence, under the territorial principle, jurisdiction can be exer-
cised only when at least part of the infringement occurs in the forum.
Second, under the Act of State Doctrine, one nation, in deference to
another, may refuse to adjudicate a matter that would call into ques-
tion the foreign country's sovereign acts or laws. However, the inter-
national order is not static and can be changed to accommodate
supra-national treatments of trademarks, which would result in
broader jurisdiction. Specifically, international treaties could create
intellectual property rights that would be effective across international
boundaries. This would completely alter the present jurisdictional
limits in intellectual property cases.
Hank M. Goldberg
Deepsouth, a patent case, does not limit a court's ability to grant injunctive relief respecting
otherwise lawful domestic acts in trademark infringement schemes consummated abroad.
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